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Hysteresis  in Import Prices:  The Beachhead  Effect 
ABSTRACT 
International  economists typically assume that temporary  real exchange rate shocks can 
have only temporary  real effects — and no effect at all on the underlying structure  of the 
economy. This paper shows that even in a simple "off—the—shelf' industrial  orgaxrization  model, 
this assumption is unfounded; if market—entry costs are sunk, exchange rate shocks can alter 
domestic market structure and thereby have lasting real  effects. In other words, a  sufficiently 
large exchange rate shock ran cause hysteresis irs import prices and quantities.  This simple idea 
has strong implications for exchange rate theory (Baldwin and Krugman  1986 shows this), for 
trade policy (Dixit  1987a discusses this),  and for the estimation  of trade equations as the present 
paper shows. 
To show that the theoretical point  is not just empirically empty  theorizing, we present 
evidence which suggests that the recent dollar overvaluation  is an  exaniple of a 
hysteresis—inducing  shock. To this end we demonstate that the pass—through  relationship shifted 
in  a manner that is consistent with the nature  and timing of the market structure  changes 
predicted by the model. In particular, we find evidence that the structural break occurred during 
the rising dollar phase rather than in 1985 as  is commonly asserted.  A direct test of the model is 
not performed due to data  limitations. 
Richard  Baldwin 
Graduate  School of Business 
Columbia University 
New York, NY 10027 
(212) 280—3491 INTRODUCTION 
International economists typically assume  that temporary real exchange rate shocks can 
have  only temporary real effects  — and no effect at all on the underlying structure of the 
economy. For instance, in the well—known Dornbusch (1976) overshooting model,  a one time 
money stock !ncrease  leads to a temporary real depreciation. However,  in the long run the shock 
is assumed  to be neutral, i.e., to have  no real effects. In the empirical trade literature, 
researchers  implicitly assume  that their trade volume and price equations are stable through 
time. In particular, they ignore the possibility that exchange  rate shocks might themselves cause 
structural breaks in the equations. 
This paper shows that, even in a simple  'oft—the--shelf" industrial organization model, this 
assumption is unfounded; if market—entry  costs are sunk,  exchange  rate shocks  can alter 
domestic market structure  and thereby have  persistent real effects. In other words large, 
temporary exchange rate shocks may result in hysteresis in import prices and quantities.1 This 
simple idea has strong implications for exchange  rate theory (Baldwin and Krugman 1986 shows 
this), for trade policy  (Dixit 1987a discusses this), and for the estimation of trade equations as 
the present paper shows. 
Moreover,  to show that the theoretical point is not just empirically empty theorizing, this 
paper presents evidence  which suggests that the recent dollar overvaluation is an example of a 
hysteresis—inducing shock. The real US dollar exchange  rate (based on wholesale price data) rose 
about 20 percent in the 18 quarters leading up to 1985:1, and fell almost as much in the 
subsequent ten quarters, This dollar cycle has had rather  puzzling effects on import prices.  The 
appreciation lowered real import prices,  and the depreciation has partially forced them back  up. 
However since the early 1980s, import prices appear to have  been  below the level predicted by 
the historical relationship. This paper formally  shows  that the pass—through relationship (of real 
exchange  rates to real import prices) has indeed shifted  in the 198,  and that the nature and 
timing of the shift is consistent with the market structure changes predicted by the model. A 
direct test of the model  is not performed  due to data limitations. 
The notion that large exchange rate changes have a qualitatively different impact on trade 2 
than do small changes is not novel.  Orcutt (19.50) conjectures that large price changes have a 
quantum effect  on import volume. Krugman (1986) conjectures that the strong dollar induced 
hysteresis in the US trade balance due to dynamic economies of scale. 
A preliminary draft of this paper,  Baldwin (1986), presents three versions of a model (the 
beachhead model) which display  hysteresis in import quantities. The present paper extends the 
latter by allowing  for an infinite horizon,  a more general  demand structure, and the presence  of 
home firms.  Moreover,  it shows that hysteresis can occur in import prices,  as well as quantities. 
A number of papers have extended the original beachhead framework.  Baldwin and 
Krugman (1986)  allows for a stochastic exchange rate process, and more importantly shows that 
hysteresis in imports leads to hysteresis in the equilibrium exchange rate, Dixit (1987a, 1987b) 
uses a related setup to show that quantity hysteresis  can occur when the exchange rate follows a 
continuous—time random walk. Foster and Baldwin (1986) examines  a  model  of marketing 
capacity constraints in which hysteresis in quantities occurs,  Bean (1987), using a modified 
beachhead  model,  finds evidence that the 1978—1981 sterling overvaluation had hysteretic effects 
on British exports. 
The paper is organized in four sections. The first presents the model.  The second studies 
the positive effects of exchange rate changes. The third presents some empirical evidence.  The 
last section  presents some conclusions. 
I. The Beachhead  Model 
The basic economia of the model  consists  of two assertions: (i) real exchange rate shocks 
can alter a country's market structure, and (ii) market structure  affects import prices and 
volumes.  We use a modified  Spence (1976) and Dixit and Stiglitz (1977) (S.—D—S)  framework to 
model the industry structure and imperfect  competition in a partial equilibrium  setting. Foreign 
and home firms engage in Cournot competition in the domestic market for a particular good 
with each firm selling a different S—D—S variety. 
* 
Home and foreign production costs (c measured in home currency and c  measured in foreign  currency) are linear homogeneous in output. Firms must also incur a fixed, sunk 
market—entry cost, F, which reflects the cost of the firm—specific and market—specific assets that 
are required to sell in the market. For example F could represent the costs of  setting up a 
distribution and service  network,  of establishing a brand name through advertising, or of 
bringing the foreign  product into conformity with domestic health and safety  regulations. The 
results would go through as long as at least  part of  F'  is sunk. 
EaLh period the firm is active  the sunk invsfment requires maintenance represented by a 
fixed maintenance cost, G. For 'xample  if F represents the cost of a brand name introduction 
advertising blitz, G would represent the brand name maintenance advertising. F and G are 
incurred in the home country and so are independent of the exchange rate.2 If G is not spent the 
sunk  asset disappears, i.e.  the firm exits3 We assume  that F > C. 
Since firms are making intertemporal decisions,  the exact nature of firms exchange  rate 
expectations are crucial  to the mechanics  of the model. The most complete approach would be to 
specify a macro model (endogenizing  the real exchange  rate) with which firms would form their 
expectations. In many such macro  models,  persistent changes  in domestic (or foreign)  monetary 
and fiscal  policies can result in perfectly  anticipated real exchange  rate shocks.4 This paper 
omits the macro  model, simply assuming that firms perfectly  anticipate the exchange  rate path. 
This assumption is not crucial to the hysteresis result.5 
We limit our attention to shocks  where the exchange rate equals e° in period zero, jumps 
in period Ito E, remains there for T—1 periods, and returns to e° in period T for all future 
periods. We refer to this stylized shock as V(E,T). An overvaluation is denoted as V(A,T), and 
an undervaluation as V(D,T). 
Chamberlain (1933) argues that an increase in the number of varieties in an industry shifts 
down and makes more elastic the demand curve for  each variety. We therefore include the 
total number of S—D—S varieties sold by home and foreign firms in the domestic market, mt, 
as an argument in the inverse  demand functions. In the spirit of the S—D—S model,  the inverse 
demand function for each firm is identical although each is for a different variety. 
Formally a typical foreign firm chooses sales, t  (all t), to maximizer * 
R"(P{mt,yt}Yt_Ctetyt__G)._F, where R=1f(1+r). r is a constant discount rate, and et is the 
t=0 
exchange rate (domestic currency per foreign currency). Since e, is deterministic, the issue of 
whether the foreigners  maximize  profits  in home or foreign  currency is moot. By S—D—S 
symmetry, y is identical for all foreign firms.  Home firms chose  sales x (all t) to 
maximize:  T Rt(P[mt,xt]xttxt)_F.  We assume the demand curve is such that  marginal 
=0 
revenue is decreasing in sales so that the second order condition is met. Clearly  the home 
operating profit function (the profit functions exclusive of F), OH, has  as its argument. The 
foreign operating profit function, OH*[et,mt, has m and e as arguments. We assume  OH and 
Ofl are smooth and decreasing in their respective arguments. 
The period zero equilibrium  is taken as given and plays the role of an initial condition. A 
prospective entrant calculates what its  discounted profits would be if it entered (choosing  sales 
optimally, based upon a period—by—period  Cournot—Nash equilibrium) allowing of  course  for the 
possibility that it may exit in the future, If discounted  profits are sufficient to cover F, the firm 
enters. Incumbant firms choose sales optimally, and if the anticipated revenues are enough  to 
cover variable costs,  they remain in the market. Since the period—by—period  sequential entry 
equilibrium concept is Cournot—Nash, the multi-period equilibrium is sub—game perfect. 
Ignoring  integer constraints, defining S.= E Ri(OIlr+itmr+i]),  and 
i=O 
S__ER'(Ofl+i[e7+,m7+j), the entry and exit conditions for home and foreign firms in 
period  T are, respectively: 
(1)  Sr>F S>F 
(2)  S<O,  S.<O 
Clearly  there is a gap between the entry and exit conditions. The gap implies  that there is 
not a unique number of firms in the period-by-period equilibria. This multiplicity of equilibria is 
the key to hysteresis. As we shall see below, a large enough V(E,T)  will permanently change the 
market structure, resulting in permanent real effects. II. The Euuiibrium 
Before studying the effects of exchange  rate shocks,  we calculate the equilibrium for a 
constant, or benchmark, exchange rate, e°. For convenience,  we assume that e0  is such that 
o  *  .  c=e c  For this e  , S  and S  equal Sb which is in turn a function  only  of a constant rn 
(m is constant since e is). Figure 1 facilitates the determination of mb. Sb[ml is decreasing in 
sincp OU and OH* are. For m < md, (I) holds so firms would enter. For m > m, (2) holds so 
some firms would exit. Any m between m and md constitutes an equilibrium since neither (1) 
nor (2) is binding. 
Foreign and home firms' sales, b  and xb respectively,  are the solutions to the Euler 
equations: 
0 = P[myj  yt[mb,yt]/t 
— cet, 
0 = P[m,x) + xtdPtmb,xtl/Oxt —ci, 
The benchmark prices,  and b  are equal to P[mb,ybj and P[mh,xbJ,  respectively. 
A. Competitivene Effects of Exchange Bate Shocks 
Next we study the link between exchange rate fluctuations and m. As we shall show, 
V(E,T) fall into two types:  V(E,T) which cause no entry or exit (we define  these as small 
exchange rate changes), and those which do (we call these large exchange rate changes). Large 
V(E,T) themselves fall into two categories: those where m° changes  in period 1 and stays 
permanently at the new level, and those where m° jumps up in period  1 and then falls 
back to m. 
To facilitate the characterization of the exchange  shock—market structure link, we define 
S. during an undervaluation and overvaluation as S.(D,T)  and S.(A,T) respectively.  Several 
properties of S.(A,T) and SXD,T) are of interest: (i) they are monotonically  decreasing in A 
and D respectively  (for all r<T), (ii) S.(A,T)  is increasing  in T, and S.(D,T)  is decreasing in T, 
and (iii) S(A,T) is non—increasing, and S(D,T) is non—decreasing through time (for all r>1). 
Properties (i) and (ii) follow directly from the definition of V(E,T) and the properties of Ofl*(et,mt). To demonstate (iii), suppose on the contrary, 41(AT) < S(A,T). Since 
cTil￿  eT., the supposition can hold  only if rnT< mTl. This in turn implies exit occurs 
in period  T—i, so ST(AT)=O, or  But then the supposition  (or mT< mTl) 
implies that ST;l(A.T)  tor 5T i  is negative. This is a contradiction, since exit insures that 
they  remain non—negative. A symmetrIc argument shows that S7(D,T) is nonecreasing with 
time. 
We consider first the set of small V(E,T). We can ignore S, since VE.T) affects it only 
through changes in the mts. The set1s end points A and D, are given by S(A,T)=F, and 
S(D',T)=O for m1=m°. A d  D1 depend on m0 as well as on T. Specifically  by (i) and (ii), the 
longer the overvaluat ton is, the closer are A  and ti  to e  ,  and the closer m  is to m0 (md), 
the closer is A1 (D') to eu. 
Property (i) implies that for all V(E,T), where A1<E<D1,  neither the entry nor exit 
condition are binding in period 1. For any small A<e°, S.(A,T) falls over time up to r=T where 
S(A,T)=Sb(mo), For small D>e° S1D,T) rises over time to Sb(m°). Clearly then neither (1) 
nor (2) ever binds, so m will not change.  This finishes our characterization of small exchange 
rate shocks. 
Next we characterize the first type of large V(A1T).  Figure 1 shows an example. S1 
depends only on mb so Sl=Sb. The V(A,T) shiftsS  up to S, thus driving m° to m1. By (iii), 
S.  shifts bark to Sb, yet m remains at m1 since neither (1) nor (2) holds after T=l. We shall 
show that any V(E,T) which causes m° to jump to an m1 within the md—rn0  range is a member 
of this first type. If m is to jump to m1 and stay there, then (1) and (2) must not bind after r=1. 
By definition of a large V(A,T), S(A,T)=F. By (iii), S.(A,T)<F after r=1, so (1) does not hold 
regardless  of the size of  rn1  By definition of  V(A,T), ST(A,T)=Sb  Thus if mlezmu, 5(A,T)>0 
for all T, so (2) never binds. When rn1=m0, then S,,(A,T)=O with m=m1. Similar  reasoning 
indicates that for all V(D,T) where ml￿md,  rn jumps down to m1 and remains there. In both 
cases, home firms never enter or exit since m stays in the md—mU  range  * 
We shall show that the second category of large shocks  involves V(A,T) which cause m1 to 
he greater than mu. If m1>m0, then m must fall to m0 by period T. Otherwise  S(A,T) would be negative. Property (iii) implies that m falls from m1 to m, and then remains there.  For such 
V(A,T) all home firms exit, since with m1>m0 Sr<O Note that no V(D,T) can drive m1 below 
md because  of home firm entry. 
B. Price Effects of Small and Large Exchange Rate Changes 
To summarize,  small V(E,T) cause no change  in market structure, while large V(E,T) do 
0  An exchange  rate shock can be  large  when it is very  big (E is very different from e  or very 
long (T is larg) Large shocks can change the size and home/foreign  composition  of m. We turn 
next to the effects of  exchange  rate movements on the price of imports. 
Rearranging (3) implies import prices are related  to e by: 
(4)  cet.  I  —  l/E[myj 
The perceived  elasticity, E, is a function of m (due to the Chamberlain assumption) and y (to 
allow for the non—constantancy of the demand elasticity). 
The time paths of F, e and m are depicted in figure 2a  for a small exchange  rate shock. At 
time zero all firms realize that e will follow the path shown. In response they lower import 
prices.  Since the shock is small (i.e., A'czE<e°) there is no change  in m so that when the 
exchange rate returns to e0, P returns to its original value.  Figure  2b shows the time paths for a 
large shock. Upon announcement  of the overvaluation, m jumps up. The price falls due to the 
marginal cost reduction (lower e reduces  foreign costs measured in home currency), and to the 
market structure change (more competition forces down profits margins). After the 
overvaluation passes, the marginal costs return to their original level. However m is still higher 
so the post_shock  price is permanently lower than the pre—shock  price.  This is hysteresis. 
111.  Empirical Evidence 
The beachhead model  argues that a large enough appreciation can induce entry and that 
the presence  of additional entrants can affect pricing behavior. In a standard time series 
regression  of the relationship between  the exchange rate and import prices this event would 8 
appear as a structural break. The unprecedented magnitude and duration of the 1980s reai dollar 
shock provides  one opportunity to test the predictions  of the model. 
Clearly, earlier real exchange rate shocks could conceivably  have  induced hysteresis. 
However the 1980s shock dwarfs  previous swings; lending support to the notion that it is the first 
large (as defined  above shock since the breakdown  of Bretton Woods. Figure 3 shows that 
between  (971 and 1980 the real dollar depreciated relatively steadily, apart from a number of 
swings which are small compared to the 1980s swing.  lKrugman and Baldwin (1987i argue that 
the 1970s dollar decline  does not reflect a shift in competitiveness  (which would  be required to 
induce hysteresis) but rather a bias in foreign  productivity growth.  Regardless  of the cause, 
Mann (1986) finds that the US pass—through relationship has been quite stable prior to the 
1980s. For these reasons,  we test only for hysteresis during the 1980s. 
The evidence in this section does not directly test the model. It is simply  intended to 
establish 1) that the historical relationship between the exchange rate and US aggregate, non—oil 
import prices  has shifted  in the 1980s, and 2) that the nature of the shift is not inconsistent with 
the predictions of the model.  Mann (1986), (1987a), (1987b),  Foster (1986), and Feinberg (1987) 
find strong evidence of parameter shifts in import price pass.-4hrough  equations at both the 
aggregate  and industry level. These studies are ad hoc in that they contain  no formal 
explanation for the cause,  timing or exact nature of the parameter shifts. Related literature 
supports the beachhead model by showing  that market structure affects foreign firm& pricing 
behavior (Dornbusch 1987, Feinberg 1986 and Masus 1987a). 
A. Three Testable Implications 
Before  turning to the data, we discuss  three testable implications  of the model.  Section 2 
shows that rn  and therefore  E, should jump up upon "announcement  of the overvaluation. The 
structural break should therefore occur upon announcement.  Operationally, we assume  that 
firms realized sometime in the early 1980s that persistent changes in the international mix of 
fiscal and monetary policies would lead to a. prolonged dollar overvaluation,  Thus: 
Implication 1:  A structural break in the pass—through equation should have occurred sometime 
in the early 1980s. 9 
This implication is robust to the exact details of the imperfect competition model chosen. 
As long  as there is a multiplicity of equilibria and real exchange rate shocks  can shift the 
economy  between  these equilibria, then implication I would hold in the broad class of models 
where pricing is affected  by market structure. 
To formulate more specific  implications about the structural break, we extend the section 
two model to account for lagged  exchange rate effects and aggregation. All section  assumpttons 
are maintained. Additionally w  assume  foreign firms face delivery lags and stochastic demand 
curves. Foreign firm j's problem is to: 
(5)  max  E{  E  Rt 





t—Q  j 
where  ti  is its delivery lag and  is the variety—specific random demand shock, Note that 
is a function of v and m from t+n 
and y from period t. Adopting the notation that 
x  is the expectation of x formed at time t—1, the typical Euler equation for y is: 
(6)  t+fl.It = 
1 
Here  we have assumed a constant elasticity demand curve,  where the & is a  non—stochastic 
function of industry h's m. Assuming firms face a variety of delivery lags ranging from 0 to N 
I 
periods, the log of the aggregate import price index, P=fl  (I  is the number of firms, 
9) is firm j's weight  in the index) will be related to current and lagged values of an index of 
firms' marginal costi, C  =fl[ceti1?1where  W1 is the set of  firms with a delivery lag 
of i periods. 
Assuming  rational expectations, and using standard macroeconornetric  arguments, it is 
easy to derive the time series properties of the expectational error (Ut) when  observed  P's are 
substituted for their expectations. Namely Ut follows a moving average (MA) process of  order 
N—i, Since u is not orthogonal to the regressands, we must instrument. Rationality also implies 1) 
that any variable lagged  N periods or more is a potential instrument. 
Empirically we use an import price index,  Pt', anda marginal cost proxy, C', which we 
assume are related toP and C  by: Pt=oPt' and  Defining =(S/v), D  = T  R. 
jEPh 
(rh 
is the set of firms in industry h), H as the number of industries, and =(p+ (  )),  the 
jE41 
pass—through equation  is: 
H  N  * 
(7)  lng(P') = log(  fl 
[  h  h  ]  ) +  alog(C) + u 
h=1  I  —  (  1/E  [mtl)  i=O 
The constant term is the parameter we are most interested in. (7) shows the constant term 
is inversely  related to the Ehrs which are directly related to the mt's. According  to the 
beachhead model,  the mt's should jump up (for industries with low enough F's), forcing the Es 
up, and the constant term down. Thus: 
Implication :  The structural break should take the form of a reduction in the constant term of 
equation (7) beginning  sometime  in the early 1980s. 
In the Chamberla.inian  framework,  additional entry increases the aggregate import price 
elasticity (which is simply  the weighted  sum of the variety—specific elasticities). Also each firm 
has a lower constant term but there are more firms, so the aggregate  constant (which is the sum 
of firns' constants) may increase  or decrease,  Lastly, the income elasticity shift is ambiguous. 
This gives us: 
Implication 3:  The price elasticity in the aggregate import demand equation should rise (in 
absolute value) synchronous  with the structural break in the pass—through equation. The 
constant term and income elasticity may rise, fall or remain unchanged. 
B. Evaluating the Implications 
To test implications 1 and 2, we estimate (7) allowing  for a once—off shift in the constant 
term via the inclusion  of an intercept dummy (see appendix for data details).7 Table 1 presents 
the two stage least squares (2SLS)  estimates of (7) using a WPI—based costs proxy and allowing 
for a maximum delivery lag of 5 quarters (N=5 was chosen a priori as a reasonable upper II 
bound).8 Since the exact timing of the break is not known,  the equation is estimated for a 
variety of break points. The results provide strong support for implications 1 and 2. For each 
break point, the shift in the intercept term is significart and of the expected  sign. 
The table I results have  several problems. First, as is usually the case with  pass—through 
equations, the point estimates of the lagged effects are often negative or insignificant  — due 
most likely  to multicollinarity  However, for none of the negative  coefficients can we reject the 
hypothesis that the true parameter is actually positive;  nor can we accept the hypothesis that 
their sum is zero. Next, the Durbin—Watson statistics are low despite the fourth--order  MA 
correction. However  for all but the 1982:1 breakpoint, the values lie within the upper and lower 
bounds  of the 5 percent points. We therefore cannot accept or reject the positive first--order 
autocorrelation hypothesis. 
Although the WPI—based measure is probably a good proxy for marginal costs, it includes 
only industrialized countries — leaving open the possibility that the shift stems from the 
exclusion of the newly industrializing countries (NICs). Also, between 10 and 20 percent of US 
non—oil imports are commodities  so the index can be expected to perform poorly during periods 
of large commodity price swings. Additionally WPIs inevitably contain the price of foreign final 
goods which do not affect production costs.  To partially redress these problems,  and to check 
that our results are robust to the specific cost proxy, we test implications  1 and 2 on two 
additional cost proxies:  one based  on normalized  unit labor costs (NULC), and one based on 
consumer  price indices (CPI), 
NULC  provides a direct measure of a significant component of firms' marginal costs. It 
avoids  the problem at including imported final goods prices,  but fails to reflect the cost of 
imported intermediate goods and commodities  (especially fuels).  Also it includes only 
industrialized countries, The third proxy consists of the Federal Reserve Board's foreign costs 
proxy, which is based on CPIs from the G—1Q  countries and 8 major NICs.  CPIs are a poor 
proxy for marginal costs (inter  alia, they include  non—traded and imported final goods  prices); 
however,  they are available for a wider range of countries and for longer periods than are more 
direct measures. Details are in the appendix. 12 
Table 2 summarizes  the results for various break points and N's (rnulticollinearity hinders 
precise  identification of the lag length). The CPI results,  like the WPI results, strongly support 
implications I  and 2. The dummies are negative and significant in all cases. The NULC  data 
provide only  weak support for the two implications, In only 2 of the 16 cases are the dummies 
significant at the 90 percent  level. However  in both cases they are negative. In all but 4 of the 
other cases, the dummies are negative but insignificant.  The insignificance  of the NULC 
estimates may he due in part to the shorter sample period, but also to the nature of the NULC. 
Since most fuels are priced in dollars, the NULO excludes  a cost component which is not directly 
affected  by the exchange  rate. Clearly  then the NULC underestimates foreign costs during the 
strong dollar period (1980—1987). This argues that the dummies may be insignificant because the 
coefficients overestimate the true dummy parameters. 
The beachhead model  predicts that the parameter shift should have occurred sometime 
during the rising dollar. Mann (1986) and Foster and Baldwin (1986) suggest the shift  occurred 
at the turning point of the dollar cycle.  It is not possible to formally identify the break point 
from the data; however,  it is possible to test these two well—specified  hypotheses against each 
other,9 To this end we estimate equation (7), with  2SLS, including an intercept dummy for the 
period from the break point to the peak  of the dollar and a second for the post—peak period, If 
the beachhead model is correct, both dummies should be negative and significant; if the 
alternative is correct, only the second dummy should be significant.  Table 3 presents the results. 
For the WPI data (which is arguably the best proxy) the alternative is clearly rejected. 
For all the various break points both dummies are negative, and in all but I case they are 
significant. The NULC  data tend to reject both hypotheses. In all cases the dummies are 
insignificant. In 3 cases both dummies are negative while in one case the first is positive and the 
second is negative. Again the low degrees of  freedom  and biases may account for these results. 
The CPI data are ambiguous. In one case both dummies are negative and significant.  In 
the other cases the first dummy is insignificant and in one case it is actually positive. The 
divergence  of the CPI and WPI results may be due to the composition  of the CPIs. If foreign 
currency production costs are constant, a rising dollar increases the competitiveness and 13 
therefore the sales of foreign firms.  However the increased sales tend to put upward pressure on 
the foreign  production costs (e.g.,  wages). Since CPIs place substantial weight on non—traded 
goods (housing and services) which are not directly sublect  to the upward pressure,  the UP! 
underestimates foreign  production costs during rising dollar periods. Consequently, the point 
estimates on he first dummy may be insignificant since they underestimate the fr'ie parameter. 
Next we turn to implication 3 by testing an aggregate import demand equation for 
parameter shifts  Spe'ifically, working  with first differences,  we regress  the log of nonil 
import volume  on the log of real US GNP and the log of current and 6 lags (quarterly data of 
relative import prices1' The lag coefficients are constrained to follow a third order polynomial 
(data details are in the appendix). 
Table 4 presents two types of evidence.  The first line shows the point estimates and 
t—ratios for the import demand equation estimated on the entire sample  period 1967:1 to 1987:2. 
The next 8 lines show how they thange when the same equation is estimated on pre— and 
post—break data, For all four break points, the post—break demand is more elastic, providing 
some support for implication 3. However  only in case 5 are the parameter shifts statistically 
significant.  The second type of evidence is the results for import demand equations which include 
dummies for the constant and price elasticity terms. Slope dummies are allowed for the current 
and lagged price terms. Only the sum of the lags and dummies are reported.'2 The intercept and 
slope dummies are insignificant in all four cases and are evenly split between positive and 
negative point estimates. 
Table 4 provides little support for implication 3. This does not necessarily cast doubt on 
the basic hysteresis hypothesis because implication 3 is not robust to small changes in the 
market structure assumptions. As is well—known, in a symmetric Cournot equilibrium with 
homogeneous  products, each firm faces the total demand elasticity multiplied by the number of 
firms.  Additional entry makes each firm face a more elastic demand curve but does not shift the 
aggregate curve. To make our basic theoretical point most clearly, we utilized the familiar 
Chamberlainian setup. If, as in Baldwin (1986), we had worked  with  homogeneous products, no 
volume  equation shifts would be expected. 14 
Tables I and 2 indicate that the elasticities perceived  by individual firms increased;  but 
table 4 indicates that the aggregate elasticity did not. One interpretation of these results is that 
most of the new entrants entered markets marked by homogeneous  goods. 
IV. QgLion5 
This paper shows that in a simple industrial organization model, large exchange  rate 
shocks can have persistent real effects, while small shocks cannot. In particular it shows that 
large exchange rate movements  should be correlated with parameter shifts in standard, 
estimated trade equations. Moreover we conjecture that the possibility  of hysteresis has 
theoretical implications for several fundamental issues  in international economics. Further 
theoretical research is required to explore this conjecture. 
Empirical tests find evidence for the predicted structural breaks in the US pass—through 
equation in the 1980s, although not for the import volume equation. In particular, we find 
evidence that the structural break in the pass—through equation occurred in the rising dollar 
phase rather  than in 1985 as is commonly asserted. Nevertheless,  the tests have little power 
against alternative hypotheses  so the breaks may be due to causes totally unrelated to the 
beachhead model.  Further empirical work is needed to directly evaluate the model. Direct tests 
require  time series data on the number of varieties of imported goods and their close substitutes 
on an industry—level. Unfortunately, such data (or good proxies) appear to exist  only  for a few 
industries (e.g., automobiles). A direct test of the model  on macro data therefore appears to be 
impossible. 
Finally, the beachhead model focuses on supply—side factors, yet empirically demand—side 
factors may be even more important. In the familiar experience—goods framework, it seems likely 
that real exchange rate shocks could cause persistent changes in consumers' information sets, 
and thereby have hysteretic effects. Additional research is needed to explore this conjecture. 15 
FOOTNOTES 
1. Hysteresis is the  failure of a property changed by an external agent to return to its original 
value when the cause of the change is removed. 
2. If F and G involved foreign currency costs, appreciations would lower entry costs as well as 
marginal costs,  making ntry more likely. 
3. Allowing for the possibility that not all of the sunk  asset disappears when the firm exits, 
would imply that the re—entry costs are below entry costs. This consideration  would complicate 
the analysis without providing any compensating insight. 
4, For example, Dornbusch (1976). 
5. Baldwin  and Krugman (1986), and Dixit (1987a)  make alternative assumptions. 
6. This assumption reduces the number of cases which must be addressed in determining the 
impact of V(E,T on m, but it does not alter the main results. 
7.  We assume  that the 1980s shock was a large V(A,T) of the first type since not all competing 
US firms exited, 
8. For instruments, we use lagged values of the nominal  exchange  rate, the nominal  foreign  cost 
proxy and nominal domestic costs. 
9. If a test statistic is to have a well—defined  distribution under both the null and alternative 
hypotheses, the model must be correct under both. That is, the hypotheses must be nested. 
Searching  for break points violates this condition. Nevertheless,  it may be of interest that for the 
WPI data the 1982:3 breakpoint had the highest R—equared. 
10. A standard assumption used to identify the import demand equation is to assume that 
supply is infinitely elaatic, 
11. Imports and ON? are trended, so the asymototic distribution of the estimator is not 
well—defined. First differencing  removes the time series' explosive component. 
12. As usual the point estimates on lagged price effects are often negative or insignificant  due 
most likely to multicollinearity. 16 
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APPENDIX 
Figure 3 is based the Federal Reserve  Board's foreign cost proxy converted to dollars and 
divided by the US GNP deflator. The Boards proxy is a trade—weighted  index of CPrs from the 
C—lU and Mexico, Brazil, Taiwan, Singapore,  Hong Kong,  South Korea, Philippines and 
Malaysia. Table I uses the NIA  non—oil  import price and a dollar—denominated, 
import—weighted  marginal costs proxy made from IMF data on manufactured goods  WPIs from 
Canada, Japan, Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, 
Netherlands, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland and UK  Both measures are deflated by the US 
manufactured goods WPI.  For lack  of a better measure, we use the NIA deflator (which is a 
variable weight  index based on unit value indices).  Shifts in import commodity composition 
may contribute to the parameter shifts.  This cannot be the whole explanation since many 
studies show that even industry level pass—through equations (where fixed weight indices are 
used) have shifted. 
Table 2 NULC  data is a dollar—denominated,  import—weighted  index of the IMF NULC 
data from the above mentioned 15 countries and the NIA deflator, both divided by the US 
NLTLC. 
Table 4 data is the NIA non-oil import value converted to volume by the corresponding 
deflator; and the relative price term is the the NIA deflator divided by the US GNP deflator. 
These data choices are standard  (Helkie and Hooper  1986) but subject to well known 
measurement error biases,  However there is no reason  to suspect that the biases have changed, 
so the structural  break tests are still valid. 19 
Table 1: Estimate Results for Pass-Through Equation on WPI data, N5 
Break 
Point  C  DUNMY  LNC  LMC1  LNC2  LNC3  LNC4  LMC5 
SE  DW R 
1980:3  3.3  —.08  .23  —.38  .14  .11  -.06  .25  .03 1.2  .90 
(10.5)  (—3.3)  (1.1) (—1.3)  (.8)  (.4)  (—.2)  (1.6) 
1982:1  5.1  -.18  -.20  .04  .22  O1  -.12  -.07 .04 0.9  .80 
(3.8)  (-2,1)  (-.6)  (.2)  (.9)  (.0) (-.3) (-.2) 
1982.3  3.9  —.11  —.07  .11  .19  .11  —.13  —.07 .02 1.7  .96 
(10.4)  (—4.2)  (—.4)  (.6)  (2.2)  (.7)  (—.8)  (—.5) 
1983:1  3.3  -.07  -.00  .08  .31  -.11  .04  -.03 .02 1.3  .95 
(13.4)  (—4.0)  (—.0)  (.3)  (3.0)  (—.5)  (.2) (—.2) 
t—statistics in parentheses. 
LMC indicates log of marginal cost proxy. 
DUMNY indicates intercept dummy. 
C indicates constant term. 
SE indicates standard error of regression. 
DW indicates Durbin-Watson statistic. 
R2 indicates R-squared statistic. 
Sample period 1975:1—1987:1,  quarterly data. 20 
TABLE 2 — Intercept Dummies: Various Data Sets and Break Points 
Manuf. WPI  Unit Labor Cost  CPI 
Sample period:  (1975:1-87:1)  (1975:1—86:3)  (1967:1—87:2) 
Max.  Break 
Point 
(N=7)  1980:3  na  — 
1982.1  na  - 
1982.3  —  + 
1983.1  —  + 
(N5)  1980:3  na 
1982.1  + 
1982.3  + 
1983.1  ma 
(N4)  1980:3  —  — 
1982.1  — 
1982 .3 
1983.1  — 
(N=3)  1980:3 
- 
—  **  —  — 
1982.1  —  —  - 
1982.3  — **  —  — 
1983.1  —  ma  - 
-  indicates that intercept  dummy is negative, implying that perceived 
demand elasticity  increases in magnitude after break point. 
+  indicates  that intercept dummy is positive, implying  that perceived 
demand elasticity decreases in magnitude after break point. 
na indicates the test could  not be performed due to non-convergence. 
** indicates  no change in constant term hypothesis  rejected at 95% 
level. 
*  indicates  no change  in constant term hypothesis rejected at 90% 
level. 21 
Table 3: Tests for Timing of Structural  Break in Pass—Through  Equation, 
N=5 
WPI  N1JLC  CPI 
Rising  Falling  Rising  Falling  Rising  Falling 
$  Dummy  $ Dummy  $ Dummy  $ Dummy  $ Dummy  $ Dummy 
Break Point 
1980:3 
1982:  1 
1982:  3 
1983:  1 
+  -  + 
—  indicates 
+  indicates 
*  indicates 
indicates 
intercept  dummy is negative. 
intercept  dummy is positve. 
dummy is significant  at 90 percent level. 
dummy is significant  at 99 percent level. 22 
Table 4 :  Structural Break Tests on Import Vaon, 
1st differences 
ESTIMATION  ON SUB-SAMPLES 
Sample  Sum of  Price 
Case  Period  C  Ct—stat)  GNP  Ct-stat)  Terms Ct-stat)  SE DW  R2 
1  67:1-87:2  .004  (0.7)  2.07  (4.2)  -0.80  (-2.1)  .04 2.6 .34 
2  67:1—80:3  .003  (0.3)  1.91  (2.7)  —0.69  (-1.1)  .05 2.6 .32 
80:4-87:2  .000  (0.0)  2.40  (3.1)  -1.08  (-1.1)  .03 2.7 .35 
3  67:1-82:1  .003  (0.3)  1.92  (3.3)  -0.63  (-1.2)  .05 2.6 .32 
82:2-87:2  —.026  (-1.3)  2.93  (2.8)  -2.10  (-1,8)  .03 3.1  .46 
4  67:1-82:3  .003  (0.5)  1.89  (3.4)  —0.70  (-1.4)  .05 2.6 .32 
82:4-87:2  —.029  (-1.4)  3.58  (2.8)  -1.63  (-1.3)  .03 2.4  .50 
5  67:1-83:1  .003  (0.3)  1.94  (3.4)  —0.67  (-1.4)  .05 2.6 .3 
83:2—87:2  —.021 (-1.7)  2.51  (3.1)  —2.26  (-2.4)  .02  1.6  .73 
ESTIMATION WITH  DUMMIES 
Break  Intercept  Sum of Price 
Point  Dummy  Dummies 
1980:3  — 
1982: 1 
1982:3  +  + 
1983:1  +  + 
Price  term is  sum  of coefficients  on current and  6  lagged terms. 
C  indicates constant term. 
None  of the dummies are significant  at the 90 percent level. Figure  1: Equilibrium  range of  firms 
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Fiqure 3: The US Dollar Real  Exchanqe Rate 
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